In recent years, China’s approach to demographic and economic expansion has sparked debates across geopolitical circles. While the country faces declining birth rates and an aging population, its long-term strategies extend far beyond domestic policies. Some analysts suggest that Beijing may seek to bolster its global influence by strategically relocating populations, fostering industrial footholds abroad, and deepening its presence in resource-rich regions. In this exclusive interview with News.az, Russian military-political analyst and strategic security expert Vladimir Bekish delves into China’s potential migration policies, its growing footprint in Russia and Africa, and the geopolitical implications of Beijing’s economic outreach. Could China’s expanding role in Russia lead to demographic shifts in key regions? How might Moscow respond to an increasing Chinese presence? And what are the broader consequences for global security?
Western media have occasionally touched on these issues, but often with a narrow focus. This conversation sheds light on deeper strategic considerations and long-term trends that could shape the global balance of power.
The demographic situation in China in recent years is far from straightforward. There has been a decline in the birth rate and, consequently, a decrease in the overall population. For China as a whole—its leadership, the ruling Communist Party, and from an economic and industrial development perspective—this is a serious challenge. A reduction in population, particularly within the working-age group, leads to a labor shortage. At the same time, the number of elderly people is growing, which requires increasing expenditures for their support and care.
Under these circumstances, the idea of “moving” the population outside the country, including to neighboring friendly states like Russia, does not appear particularly likely. However, there is an important nuance that could provide momentum for such a strategy: China’s long-term objective of strengthening its control over various countries and regions. As is well known, China does not confine itself to short-term plans.
It is possible that, as part of bolstering its partnership with Russia, China will, by mutual agreement, establish production facilities on Russian territory: automobile plants, electronics and clothing manufacturing facilities, and so on. Naturally, Chinese workers would staff these enterprises, meaning they would also reside in Russia. What follows is a familiar process: the formation of a Chinese diaspora, the creation of a circle of local producers and consumers, and even the appearance of mixed marriages. The end result would be the “Sinicization” of certain regions and cities, compelling the Russian authorities to take into account the increased presence of PRC citizens.
– Which economic or geopolitical factors might spur China toward a more active migration policy in the future?
Part of the answer is already implicit in the previous discussion. If we consider China’s possible migration policy on a global scale, the key factors will be: access to raw materials, access to technology, and the expansion into and dominance of new markets. In this regard, one can confidently say that China will continue to “expand” into Africa: it is a true treasure trove of natural resources, many of which remain underexplored. Meanwhile, global demand for oil, lithium, cadmium, and other resources is steadily rising, especially in China.
Even today, the PRC has a strong foothold in Africa and often operates there with considerable autonomy from local authorities, wielding significant influence. From personal experience: when I was in Sudan, a large Chinese company set up a “closed compound” for its employees in Khartoum . It was so restricted that even the local police struggled to enter. And although Sudan is an Islamic country where alcohol is banned, one could easily buy Chinese spirits in that company’s cafe.
Returning to the idea of “capturing” markets, one only needs to look at the Russian car market—Chinese vehicles now dominate there. Russians have had to accept Chinese manufacturers, their service networks, and spare parts. Moreover, the “Moskvich-3,” which is produced in Russia, is actually fully Chinese; it is merely assembled on a Russian production line.
– Which scenario for the settlement of Chinese nationals in Russia seems most likely: gradual economic development of specific territories, labor migration, or other models?
As noted above, if a significant influx of Chinese migrants into Russia does occur, the primary cause will be economic development: controlling existing enterprises and markets, as well as establishing new ones. Many Russians are already aware that Chinese entrepreneurs on the Far East frontier have long been involved in the timber business and exporting lumber to China. There have been multiple scandals regarding the scale of logging and export, which has not always adhered to official licenses and agreements.
It is conceivable that China could also become interested not just in timber but in extracting gas and other natural resources—diamonds, gold , and uranium—from those same Far Eastern or Siberian regions.
– Does the Chinese leadership have plans to develop new territories abroad for Chinese settlement, especially given domestic urbanization and resource shortages?
Most likely, such plans already exist and will be refined further, driven by two main factors: the demographic situation mentioned earlier and China’s desire to extend its influence across various regions worldwide, effectively bringing them under its control and “developing” them.
First, the government might be prompted to relocate some of its pensioners abroad—where it would only pay their pensions, leaving expenses for food, housing, and medical services to the local system.
As for resource shortages, China is closely eyeing Africa, as well as certain Middle Eastern countries (given the situation in Syria) and Latin America. Chinese companies have already been operating in Venezuela for many years, which is also true of Chile and Mexico.
– How might countries such as Russia respond to a potential increase in Chinese migration? What regulatory mechanisms could be employed to balance both parties’ interests?
This would be no easy task for Russia. After all, Moscow and Beijing are partners, and Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping maintain close personal ties. Imagine Xi calling Putin one day and asking, “Why did your National Guard detain my compatriots? There are only 70,000 of them, and they’re helping your economy…”
It is likely this “small” group would be released immediately. Russia’s ability to influence China’s global strategy, as well as its internal tactics, is quite limited. Essentially, Russia can only negotiate and make concessions—or else suddenly become stronger than China. For example, if former U.S. President Donald Trump decided to test America’s hypersonic nuclear weapons “in defense of Taiwan,” he might not be overly worried about China’s response, counting on the “Iron Dome” already deployed over the United States…
